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As political scientists have become aware of the potential gains involved in comparing the European Union with other political systems, more of them have come to see the United States as a natural comparator.  Partly, this is explicable at an empirical level, a function both of the many similarities between the two systems, and (as will be argued) largely misplaced assumptions concerning the similarity of their developmental trajectories. Because the EU does many things national political systems do, some observers have assumed the former adopted the institutions of the latter and functions as they do. They have, in other words, extrapolated from function to form and functioning.   Partly, too, this has been the result of a desire amongst some to see the methodological tools used to study American politics applied to the European Union.

The intellectual self-confidence of those who have applied insights derived from the study of the US to the EU is reflected in their growing ambitions, exemplified by claims not only that approaches derived from the study of American politics can help to explore the nature and functioning of the European Union, but also that they can do so in an intellectually more rigorous, more useful and more effective manner than can those formulated by scholars within the discipline of International Relations. 

The current paper does not dispute that approaches from Comparative Government can bring added value to the study of the EU. Nor is its intention to suggest that comparisons between the EU and nation states perform no useful function – quite the contrary. Rather, it argues that, in order to gain a full understanding of the European Union, observers must be conscious of the specific – international – nature of the politics that occurs within it. The EU contains elements that are irreducibly international, which makes the character of interactions within it fundamentally different from those within national political systems, even federal ones. Largely, though not exclusively, because of the unique nature of states as political actors, politics between them differs in numerous fundamental ways from the politics found within them. Comparative Government approaches are often based on insights about the nature of politics that are not easily transposable from the domestic to the international realm.  Their analyses rooted in assumptions about the texture and nature of national politics, they are simply unable to explain the development and functioning of the Union. 

This paper is divided into three sections. Section one discusses how and why it is that so many observers have been drawn to apply insights from domestic politics to the study of the Union and illustrates how certain of them have claimed that Comparative Government can be used to improve, or even supplant, International Relations as the discipline most able to explain the development and functioning of the Union. Section two examines three aspects of interstate politics in the EU that tend to undermine such claims. Section three briefly underlines the importance of these in understanding the Union’s nature and development over time. 

COMPARATIVE POLITICS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
The lure of Comparative Politics
Until the early part of the 1990s, the study of the politics of European integration largely languished in an intellectual ghetto, divorced from examinations of other political systems, be they domestic or international.​[2]​ Over the last decade and a half, however, scholars have come to recognise the debilitating effects of the ‘n=1 problem’ (ECSA 1997) and have taken steps to address it.  In particular, students of Comparative Government have increasingly taken both to using the methods of comparative politics to analyse the Union (Hix 1994; 1999; Jachtenfuchs 2001; Sedelmeier 2001) and, more specifically, because of its multi-tiered nature, to comparing the EU directly with federal political systems in general, and with the United States in particular  (1999; McKay 2001; Nicolaidis and Howse 2001; Kelemen 2004; Menon and Schain 2006). 

The tendency to compare the EU and US is easily understandable.  After all, they share several traits, including: potentially comparable institutional landscapes (Kreppel 2006; Shapiro 2006); apparently parallel developmental trajectories (Donahue and Pollack 2001) and strikingly similar institutional dynamics stemming from comparable federal structures (Kelemen 2006).  Most fundamentally,  ‘the…EU implicates and exhibits authority over its constituent members in ways reminiscent of a domestic polity’ (Jupille and Caporaso 1999: 429), or, as Weiler puts it (2001: 56), '...the constitutional discipline which Europe demands of its constitutional actors - the Union itself, the Member States and State organs, European citizens and others - is in most respects indistinguishable from that which you would find in advanced federal states'.

Initially, it was European scholars who were the most enthusiastic proponents of a comparative politics approach to the EU (see notably Hix 1994), while Americans tended to deploy the tools of International Relations (Jupille and Caporaso 1999: 430; Jachtenfuchs 2001: 256; Sedelmeier 2001). One possible explanation for this divergence is the fact that Europeans are directly exposed to the effects of European integration. Because, from a European perspective, the Union appears to do what states do, with similar effects to those exerted by state actions, it makes sense to compare the Union with a ‘normal’ polity (Jachtenfuchs 2001: 256). 

More fundamentally, the comparative bent stems from a growing realisation that students of domestic and international politics are increasingly confronted with converging empirical and intellectual trends, including globalisation, the salience of domestic-international linkages and the role of institutions both domestic and international (Jupille, Caporaso et al. 2003: 10). As ‘domestic society has elements of anarchy (contract enforcement and  cheating are problematic)…the international system has substantial elements of governance and rule’ (Jupille and Caporaso 1999: 438), or, as Helen Milner (1998: 760) puts it, ‘within states anarchy threatens, whereas the institutionalization of international politics beckons’. As the apparent overlap of concerns between political science and International Relations has grown, so too has the tendency to apply theoretical approaches from domestic politics to international relations. 

The application to the EU of theories and approaches formulated to explore and explain domestic politics has yielded numerous insights, as political scientists have focused their attention on issues that colleagues from International Relations might well have overlooked. Examples include work on the role of interest groups (Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Mazey and Richardson 1993; Kohler-Koch 1994), public opinion (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993), political parties (Attina 1990), as well as analyses of the striking similarity of the judicial system of the Union with that of many federal states (Kelemen 2006; Shapiro 2006) , or of the role of veto points in shaping policy outcomes (Scharpf 1988).

The Domestic Politics Fallacy
It can hardly be denied that the insights provided by Comparative Government have proved instructive, nor that they have been tremendously useful in compensating for the numerous ‘blind spots’ inherent in a discipline of International Relations often guilty of excessive introspection and a fascination bordering on obsession with the question of whether institutions matter, rather than how and in what ways they do (Martin and Simmons 1998: 742-3).  

Increasingly, however, scholars have gone beyond merely exploring the merits of Comparative Government to dismissing the contribution International Relations approaches can make. At their least pernicious, such claims reflect a view that Comparative Politics in and of itself provides the tools needed to study ‘policy’ even within an international organisation such as the European Union, whilst International Relations approaches can be relegated to the study of institution building (Hix 1994; Jachtenfuchs 2001).  More broadly, certain scholars have claimed that IR as a distinct sub-field is losing its intellectual relevance. Helen Milner (1998: 759) has claimed that the separation of International Relations from other fields in political science has ‘limited the field’s ability to understand international relations even during the Cold War period, let alone since its passage.’ The remedy, it would appear, is for IR to turn to comparative politics for solutions in the form of a ‘steady infiltration of analytical concerns from comparative politics into international relations….a brisk import trade where the common knowledge of one field comes to be regarded as path breaking research in another’ (Jacobsen 1996: 95). 

Mark Pollack, in a survey of IR approaches to integration, comments that the importation of the new institutionalism into EU studies has succeeded in ‘enriching IR theory and reducing its traditional parochialism and exceptionalism’(Pollack 2001: 238). A recent survey of institutionalist thought concluded that empirical and intellectual developments have ‘rendered subfield distinctions increasingly anachronistic and potentially counterproductive. Institutionalism especially seemed to provide an intellectual bridge, promising, according to its advocates, a general theory applicable to comparative, international, and American politics’ (Jupille, Caporaso et al. 2003: 10; see also Milner 1998).

Such assertions raise several concerns. First, they seem based on a cursory and superficial understanding of the International Relations literature (Rosamund 2000: 157-186). In abrogating, as many students of domestic politics do, the term ‘comparativist’, they overlook the comparative work undertaken not only by the early neofunctionalists, but also by more recent IR theorists (Mattli) (though one would be justified in bemoaning the relative dearth of such comparative endeavours in the subfield).​[3]​ 

More substantively, even if one accepts the premise that the concerns of the two disciplines are increasingly similar, it does not follow that the consequent learning process should be unidirectional. In assessing two subfields that have tended to reify the distinctions between themselves, the question of which is exceptional, or parochial, is very much one of perspective. Students of domestic politics have recently come to realise the potential advantages inherent in the use of the kinds of non-cooperative game theory frequently deployed to study international politics (Martin and Simmons 1998: 739; Milner 1998). Moreover, if IR scholars have been guilty of, amongst other things, oversimplifying the state, the problem with much work on comparative politics is its failure to acknowledge a role for international factors in its investigations of domestic politics (Hurrell and Menon 2003). One illustration of this has been the paucity of attention paid by researchers on comparative politics to policy sectors highly sensitive to international conditions such as foreign and defence policy. In an era when globalization and interdependence are the themes of the moment, it seems somewhat bizarre to downgrade the relevance of the international for studies of the domestic. 

A clearer appreciation of the problems inherent in applying approaches developed for the study of comparative politics to the international realm can be gleaned by examining one such approach in more detail. 

THE LIMITS OF RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM
Rational choice approaches to the study of domestic politics have been the focus of those who claim that comparative politics can improve upon existing International Relations scholarship. The forcefulness of many of the proponents of rational choice stems from their engagement in a methodological as much as disciplinary or theoretical crusade.  Several of those who claim that rational choice institutionalism represents an untapped resource in better understanding the world of international politics obfuscate the distinction between theory and the rationalist approach to politics. Thus, for Milner (1998), the adoption of rational choice institutionalism holds out the prospect of students of international relations being able better to comprehend the role both of domestic politics and of international institutions in shaping international affairs. 

Yet there is no necessary link between the rationalist research agenda and a substantive interest in either domestic politics or international institutions. Indeed, perhaps the seminal rationalist account of international politics studiously overlooks both (Waltz 1979). What It is difficult to avoid the impression that Milner is engaged simply in a thinly disguised attempt to provide a theoretical justification for a methodological predilection. Indeed, carried away by their zeal, proponents of rational choice institutionalism sometimes betray an alarming disdain for much of the non-rationalist literature even on domestic politics. The claim that American rational choice scholars ‘were the first to theorise explicitly about the control relationship between legislative principals and bureaucratic agents’ (Pollack 2002: 200) betrays, at a minimum, an extremely narrow definition of theory, one which excludes, to take but the most obvious example, the  work of Max Weber elucidating the inherent problems involved in reconciling hierarchy and expertise in bureaucratic systems (Weber 1988).

Whatever the motivation behind it, recent scholarship has placed much emphasis on so-called theories of delegation as a rational choice approach suited to the study of politics in the Union (for a critical survey, see Kassim and Menon 2003). Mark Pollack issues an explicit appeal that ‘students of delegation and agency outside the American context should learn from the experience of Americanists and draw from that literature those methods that are…transferable to other contexts’ (Pollack 2002). His case rests on a simple premise, notably that: 

Although not a national political system, the Union has a number of characteristics…which make it analytically similar to the US political system, and hence a promising testing ground for American-derived theories of delegation and agency 
Pollack (2002: 211-2)

Others have also argued that the international context of the EU should and will not detract from the clear benefits of applying this kind of institutional analysis (see notably Jupille and Caporaso 1999: 431), while Milner (1998: 780) states baldly that a ‘common language for thinking about institutions at both the domestic and international levels has emerged; such a common language is important because it allows one to make generalizations across diverse contexts'.  

Context, however, matters. For one thing, principal-agent approaches were deployed in the study of American politics primarily in relation to a specific aspect of those politics – implementation – qualitatively different from decision making, which has been the object of their application to the EU. More significantly, assuming rationality (with all that this entails) is, at its simplest, what rational choice is about. There is no inherent assumption here about the nature of the actors involved in strategic interactions (though there is an inherent tendency to assume all actors would act in the same way if confronted with the same situation – see Hay 2004). The real problem confronting the application of new institutionalist theories to the European Union relates to the fact that the models employed to analyse relations between Congress and executive agencies in the United States are grounded in assumptions derived from the American domestic setting. As the following sections illustrate, these assumptions are inherently problematic in that they cannot fully capture the nature and behaviour of the key actors involved in the process of delegation in the international realm.​[4]​

States and international politics
The nature of international politics and of the predominant actors within it differentiates the relationship between member state principals and their agents from those pertaining within domestic politics. This applies to the reasons for delegation as much as to its nature. The states that make up the European Union are motivated by factors specific to actors in the international realm.  The centrality of considerations of power and security in international politics means that institutions are often viewed as tools to manage interstate relationships, themselves perceived through the prism of geopolitics.  Traditional Comparative Politics explanations of actor strategies in policy making thus ‘cannot deal with a central motivation of much EU policy making – namely the management of unequal state power and the desire to tie certain states within a structure from which they have the option to defect.’ (Hurrell and Menon 1994: 392). The genesis of two of the major initiatives of recent times -  the euro and enlargement, cannot be understood except as a function of such power-related considerations  (Hurrell and Menon 2003). 

In terms of the principal-agent relationship arising out of the initial act of delegation, the international context is again somewhat different from its domestic counterpart. Because they are sovereign political entities with significant resources, states do not find themselves in the position of mutual dependence that characterizes many if not most principal-agent relationships in domestic political settings. Congressional committees and executive agencies in the US are, to a large extent mutually dependent: they need to work together in order to achieve their objectives. In contrast, dependence in the EU system is unidirectional. While the EU institutions rely on agreement between member states in order to function effectively, EU membership represents only one of a number of relationships and institutional entanglements in which the member states are involved (Hurrell and Menon 1994). Consequently, and unlike domestic political actors, they posses the ability to make choices as to the most appropriate institutional venue for their initiatives. 

Member states, moreover, enjoy the ability to act independently of institutional settings: they can have a currency without relying on the ECB, and a visa policy without joining Schengen (see Moravcsik 2004: 346). They can also turn to alternative international institutions in policy sectors where European integration does not seem appropriate – hence the continued reliance of Europe on NATO for collective defence. The non-exclusivity of member states’ relationships with the Union has had important implications for the role of territory in shaping EU politics. Bartolini (2004) explains how the gradual replacement of territorial, in favour of functional, representation within European states was explicable in terms of the development of national boundaries:

The more closed and reinforcing the various types of boundaries, the more likely that territorial issues will be in the long run incorporated within broader functional cross local alliances. The more open the territorial boundaries and the more loosely bounded the polity's territories, the more likely territorial alternatives will differentiate and become the focus of political conflict.
(Bartolini 2004)

The control exercised by states over their borders prohibited exit strategies on the part of domestic actors. In contrast, member states confront few EU-imposed boundaries on their activities and can rely on national, European or international fora to achieve their objectives. Partly as a consequence, the Union enjoys only weak territoriality (Ansell 2004), particularly in comparison with its constituent units, whilst politics within it remains dominated by territorial considerations.​[5]​ The contrast with the United States is instructive. There, the American Civil War effectively foreclosed exit options, and hence choices of institutional venues for the states (Fabbrini 2004), leading over time to the increasing prevalence of functional, as opposed to territorial, politics. This should come as no surprise to students of international relations. The fact that states tend to be less functionally specialised than regions in a federal system is a defining feature of the international realm according to the classic account of structural realism (Waltz 1979: 93-7).​[6]​

Moreover not only are states autonomous and well resourced, but they are also sovereign entities, and their sovereignty is crucial in terms of conferring upon them both authority and a claim to be respected. The right of sovereignty confers upon them a legal basis for their claim to privileged status. Internally, state power resources are reinforced by significant legitimacy. The survival of the nation state as the dominant form of political organisation in world politics is explicable to a large extent in terms of the legitimacy of nation states, which has proved ‘a more powerful determinant of the prevailing scale of government authority than either greater homogeneity of sub national communities or greater powers of supranational political units’ (Scharpf 1988: 240). Member states, unlike the Union are thus self-authenticating, deriving their legitimacy directly from their peoples

This legitimacy has proved crucial in terms of shaping the relationship between states and international institutions, if only because populations have proved willing to accept sacrifices imposed by national governments, whilst their reaction to the partial impotence of governments in the face of domestic and international pressures has been to ‘cling to and if possible to reinforce the nation-state’ (Hoffmann 1982: 23). The legitimacy of states means that populations may be willing to accept sub-optimal outcomes as a result of autonomous policy choices, as long as these are national choices, whilst rejecting integrative solutions that are potentially more efficient. 

Thus, whilst one may or may not consider rational choice the most apposite approach to utilise, crucial differences exist between international and domestic contexts in terms of the dependence of the whole on the parts, and the nature and authority of these parts. 

States as Organisations 
The second factor differentiating states from domestic actors are their organisational resources. It is here that the dangers inherent in importing insights from domestic politics are perhaps clearest. Applications of the principal-agent model to American politics argue that political ‘principals’ constantly confront the danger of ‘shirking’ by executive agencies, because of the incomplete information at the disposal of principals concerning the possible actions of agents (Weingast and Moran 1983; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991: 25).​[7]​ Information asymmetries lead to the possibility of agents exploiting `the costs of measuring their characteristics and performance to behave opportunistically’ (Doleys 2000: 537). Based on such insights, many have assumed that the EU possesses a crucial advantage over the member states, because `in the EU…information is largely controlled by the supranational Commission’ (Aspinwall and Schneider 2001: 7 see also Pollack 1997: 108 and Pierson 1998: 40)

However, we should be wary of assuming that lessons from the study of delegation within states are applicable to delegation in the international realm by states.  States possess characteristics that render the nature of their interactions with international institutions qualitatively different from those pertaining between actors and institutions in domestic political settings. Unlike the American states which came together to form the United States, West European states are powerful organisations, capable of mobilizing significant resources, including often-sizeable ministries, to monitor developments in all aspects of public policy, and provide a level of expertise that the relatively small staffs of international institutions cannot hope to match. As Moravcsik puts it (1999: 272), why ‘should governments, with millions of diverse and highly trained professional employees, massive information-gathering capacity, and long-standing experience with international negotiations at their disposal, ever require the services of a handful of supranational entrepreneurs to generate and disseminate useful information and ideas?’​[8]​ The simple fact that all the member states have embassies to both the European Union and the other member states serves to emphasise the organisational resources deployed with a view to providing rapid and reliable information on developments within the Union. 

Moreover, unlike in domestic political settings, the provision of information via the use of police-patrol oversight in a situation of multiple principals does not represent a public good (Pollack 1997: 111). Rather, in a context of nation states competing for influence within the institutional setting of the EU, information is very much a private good, to be used in securing comparative advantage over one’s competitors. Intelligence gleaned about the actions and intentions of supranational institutions is employed by states to steal a march over their rivals  (Menon 2003). Unlike the actors in domestic politics, therefore, states have an incentive to ensure they are as well informed as possible, as the often complex mechanisms they employ to do so illustrate (Kassim, Peters et al. 2000; Kassim, Menon et al. 2001)

None of this is to argue that problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are absent in international institutions – and one can assume that these will be more acute for smaller states, whose administrations may well lack expertise even relative to that within EU institutions. Nor is it to deny that rational choice institutionalism could contribute much to the study of this relationship. Rather, member state resources imply that informational asymmetries will be less frequent, and less severe, than the literature on US politics implies. Informational problems are mitigated in the international realm, and hence assumptions utilised in a domestic context may need to be amended before being applied to an international organisation.

International Institutions
States, therefore, are unlike the kinds of actors one might find in a domestic polity.  And their uniqueness has implications for the structure of the principal-agent relationships into which they enter. For one thing, member states can attempt to design institutional arrangements that minimize, if not preference incompatibilities, then at least the opportunity for agents to act opportunistically. Several pertinent strategies are open to them. Unlike in the American system, where the principal (Congress) may not enjoy the power of appointment (Moe 1987: 489), governments generally do enjoy this right over the staff of international institutions. Whilst adverse selection problems still bedevil them, they are nonetheless in a position to be able to choose candidates whose preferences are close to their own. Governments `will appoint people who have internalized the goals of the states rather than the organizations even when they are not officially there as representatives’ (Nicholson 1998: 85). Certainly, this is a theme addressed in the principal-agent literature (see, for example, Laver and Shepsle 1996: 13-15), though the importance of selection has been underplayed in its applications to the European Union.  Almost as important, in order to avoid the danger of officials `going native’ in post is the power of reappointment, which can also be used to shape the behaviour of national officials in international posts.

More fundamentally, principal-agent approaches in economics, and the variants used to study American domestic politics, assume that there exist fundamental incentive incompatibilities between principals and agents. This assumption has been transposed by many authors to the relationship between member states and the EU. Thus:

EC organisations will seek to use grants of autonomy for their own purposes, and especially to increase their autonomy. They will try to expand the gaps in member-state government control, and they will use any accumulated political resources to resist efforts to curtail their authority. The result is an intricate, ongoing struggle. 
(Pierson 1998: 35 see also Pollack 1997: 108). 

Yet is this really credible? Member states are not only powerful in terms of their own resources, but also in the way they can use these to shape the actions of others. For one thing, they enjoy a striking ability to `introduce incentive structures into the agency relationship that encourage preference compatibility’ (Doleys 2000: 537).  Crucially, they can make full use of the control they exercise over the prospects of those who wish to return to work within the national administration. Whilst it is reasonable to assume that employees of a US Federal Agency do not aspire to become Congressmen, officials in international organizations may well seek to prolong their careers in national administrations, or conceivably even national politics.​[9]​ In this case – particularly for those on short-term contracts - the home government enjoys a significant ability to ensure loyalty. After all, where one stands depends not only on where one sits (Allison and Zelikow 1999: 307), but also on where one wants to recline later.​[10]​ 

That  those working for the EU institutions may well feel the temptation to aspire to senior positions back ‘home’ was clearly illustrated under the last European Commission, as Commission President Prodi was widely seen to have neglected his duties in Brussels to focus on manoeuvring for a return to Italian politics. It is hard indeed to imagine an analogous situation in the United States, involving a President intent on securing a Governorship. And whilst one could imagine a situation in Europe where the structural equivalent of State Governors – Heads of State and Government – focussed on the ambition of high office at the European level, it is imaginable only in the case of smaller member states. The point, again, is not to claim that similarities do not exist between federal systems and the European Union, but that the assumptions generally used in studies of the former, especially in terms of actor incentives, may be called into question in the case of the latter. ​[11]​    

The ability of member states to influence the officials who staff international institutions reinforces the arguments made above concerning the resources of the member states.  The presence of nationals within the institution concerned, nationals who may find it in their interests to cooperate closely with their home nation, serves further to diminish the problem of informational asymmetries confronting the member states.​[12]​ The nature of international politics, as well as the nature, resources and organisation of states makes for a different texture of politics between, as opposed to within, states. 

International Relations and the development of the European Union
Those who compare the US and EU systems are drawn, perhaps inevitably, from assertions regarding the comparability of the two institutional systems, to arguments implying the probable similarity of their developmental trajectories. Thus, the claim that the Union shares with federal systems like that of the US ‘a constitutionally defined…separation of powers between a central government and individual Member States’ (Donahue and Pollack 2001: 95) leads to the assertion that the US and EU: 

display similar alternations of centripetal and centrifugal impulses….the centralising impulse is likely to reassert itself in both polities in the century’s early years. The next period of predominant centralisation, moreover, should be somewhat sharper and shorter in Europe than in the US, as the asynchronous rhythms of the two polities - one a mature federation, the other not - move out of phase.​[13]​
(Donahue and Pollack 2001: 116)

Less explicitly, much of the most influential work applying principal-agent models to the Union draws on a similar logic, applying, somewhat uncritically, the literature on the United States to emphasise the problems member states face in controlling supranational agents, and the ‘gaps’ in their control that subsequently emerge (Pollack 1997; Pierson 1998).​[14]​ 

Turning first to the question of structure, it is profoundly misleading to talk in terms of some kind of ‘separation of powers’ between the Union and the member states.​[15]​ The nature of politics between states has, from the first, been highly influential in shaping the institutional structure of European integration. Particularly in comparison to that of federal systems, this reflected the desire on the part of the member states to safeguard their authority over their creation.  Consequently, and in stark contrast with the US, the member states designed a system in which their institutional interests are represented via the Council of Ministers (Sbragia 1991: 2, 5; see also McKay 2001: 130-1). The Senate never functioned as a ‘Council of the states’, even under the short-lived, and ultimately unsuccessful ‘doctrine of instructions’ (McKay 2001: 133). Rather, Senators represent their constituents. In contrast, in systems where state governments participate directly in central decision making, it is the interests of these governments that are voiced. Even here we can distinguish between systems of state representation at the centre, such as Germany, where, the central government enjoys political identity, resources and strategic and tactical capabilities of its own, and the EU, where the central institutions enjoy no such advantages over the constituent units.  As Sbragia puts it: 

Community politics and national politics are institutionally intertwined rather than insulated from each other….one can discuss American politics and policymaking without mentioning a single governor...the privileged status enjoyed by member governments in the Community's political system has no analogue in the US system. American state officials do not participate personally in national policymaking.  For their part, American national politicians represent voters who happen to reside in states; they do not represent governors or state legislators. Thus, in the United States, the representation of the institutional interests of state governments in national policymaking is not constitutionally entrenched.
(Sbragia 1991: 5)

Member state representation, moreover, is more than symbolic. As argued above, their administrative capacities give them the ability to exploit to the full their privileged institutional position and to represent and defend their interests within the Union (Sbragia 1991: 2).

The institutional system of the Community as a whole was designed in such a way as to facilitate the stolid defence of perceived national interests should the desire for enhanced cooperation falter. Scholars who take their cues from a domestic analogy tend to emphasise the importance of the Commission’s monopoly over the right of legislative initiative as a cornerstone of its influence (Pollack 1997). An alternative reading, however, would be that member states ensured ultimate control for themselves by ensuring that they could react against any Commission proposals. Thus, Taylor comments, with reference to the ‘eurosclerosis’ of the 1970s, that:  

the institutions of the Communities made it easy for national governments to adopt a defensive stand if they so wished; they were designed to allow a relatively undramatic, stonewalling approach if it happened that in practice the government's expectations of future compatibilities were unrealised
(Taylor 1975: 339).​[16]​

Agenda setting power is crucial in any political system, but the influence of the agenda setter is dramatically curtailed in a situation when the core legislators are not interested in working together. 

Member states form the core of the EU decision-making system. Certainly their role is not exclusive, and the European Parliament, most notably, has seen its legislative powers enhanced considerable during the course of successive treaty revisions. Yet whilst the EP, acting in concert with coalitions of member states in the Council, represents a more effective legislative body than many, if not most, national parliaments, it is, ultimately, the Council which is the crucial legislator in the EU system. And it is the member states qua member states that sit in the Council. In this sense, even in matters of core legislative activity, the EU is in no real sense separate from its constituent member state parts. 

Moreover, and far from incidentally, it is the member states, via the European Council that control the size of the EU budget. As a consequence, this is limited to around 1% of the Union’s GDP, thereby severely limiting the ability of ‘Brussels’ to buy either loyalty or compliance, and ensuring the absence of a tool employed to powerful effect by many federal systems, notably the US, where ‘“[c]oercive cooperation” is underpinned by the cash which Washington dispenses to state capitals’(Sbragia 2006). 

Structural differences between the EU and federal systems help account for differences in their developmental trajectory. Here, it is important to differentiate between what Taylor (1975) refers to as the ‘scope’ of integration and its ‘level’. On the one hand, it is clear that the attribution of tasks by member states to the European level has continued, with ever more sensitive areas of public policy – immigration, cooperation on counter-terrorism, and defence policy amongst them – being affected by the Union. Yet EU involvement or activity in a policy sector does not imply a shift in power from the parts to the centre, given that the member states themselves wield such tremendous influence over what occurs in ‘Brussels’. Contrast this with an American system in which ‘the exercise of federal government functions is formally independent of the governments of the American states, and those functions that have been taken over by the federal government are effectively nationalised’ (Scharpf 1988: 242)

And if the 1990s witnessed a steady accretion of new competences at the European level, this was accompanied by persistent and consistent measures adopted to ensure member state control. Crucially, the international character of the Union empowered the member states in their attempts to claw back authority. Because the Union is based on a treaty rather than a constitution, member states enjoy levels of control over its development that are unparalleled in national federal systems. For one thing, the treaty base uniquely empowers states as institutions to intervene between citizens and the Union in treaty negotiations (Chopin 2002: 43-8).​[17]​ Moreover, not only is no formal role given to the EU institutions in negotiations over treaty change, but such negotiations uniquely empower the negotiators. Whilst:

amendments to a constitution resemble a continuing dialogue with previous political and constitutional developments, the formulation of new treaties can differentiate among whatever institutional innovations were made in previous treaties. Treaties allow for much greater discontinuity in institutional development, a disjuncture that permits national governments to control the timing and shape of institution building relatively closely.
(Sbragia 1991: 273)

Thus the treaty base provides member states with a large amount of latitude in shaping the nature of the system, for instance by isolating some areas of policy from the ambit of the EC and limiting the power of the supranational institutions over them, as they did with the creation of the pillared structure in the treaty on European Union. Finally, member states ensure a large degree of control over the development of the Union by insisting that substantive changes to its nature and functioning be decided on via treaty amendment. In order that they be bound in new areas, a Treaty revision must be unanimously agreed – in contrast to the profound changes ushered in in the United States by the New Deal – without the need for constitutional amendment (Sbragia 2006). 

The trend towards increasing member state assertiveness first manifested itself at Maastricht, with the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity, explicitly intended to put an end to ‘competence creep’ (Majone 1998), and the creation of the pillared structure (possible because of the treaty rather than constitutional base), which distanced the ‘supranational’ institutions from the sensitive areas of foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs. As the decade progressed, member states tightened their hold on developments within the Union in numerous ways, including via the increased prevalence of Intergovernmental Conferences, with progressively more detailed agendas, the growing dominance of the European Council, and the introduction of new forms of decision making, such as the Open Method of Coordination, or the purely intergovernmental method adopted for the emergent European Security and Defence Policy (Kassim and Menon 2005). The still to be ratified constitutional treaty merely reaffirms and reinforces such trends, bolstering subsidiarity with the provision for member state parliaments to vote on draft EU legislation. It also underlines the degree to which member states remain anxious to preserve their position as ultimate drivers of the integration process via the creation of a President of the European Council.


In sum, if analysts were able, in the early 1990s, to assert that the Governments of the twelve exerted immeasurably more influence on Community policies than American state governments exert on federal policies within the United States (Sbragia 1991: 2), this is all the more true after the events of the last decade. These have served to highlight the instrumentality of a Union system created and maintained to serve the interests of its constituent member states and continually recast in order to reflect changing state preoccupations and purposes. 

Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has not been to claim that International Relations necessarily provides all the answers for those interested in studying the European Union.  Indeed, it is not difficult to find serious shortcomings in the IR literature on European integration, including the failure (ironically) to recognise the key role of geopolitics (Moravcsik 1998), and the obsession, referred to above, with the debate about whether institutions matter or not. Nor is its intention to claim that Comparative Government specialists should not engage in comparisons of the Union with federal states for, although ‘the Community is unique, analysis is more likely to suffer from studying it in isolation from other systems than from using the comparative method in less than ideal circumstances.' (Sbragia 1991: 268).

There is, however, a danger in the over-zealousness of some in assuming both that the EU and US are obviously comparable cases (thereby overlooking the possibility that other federal political systems - whether Germany, or Switzerland, or Canada, or India - might represent more apposite comparators), and that comparisons with domestic political systems are the appropriate methodology to deploy.  A fixation with the United States is particularly inappropriate given the fact that the US itself arguably represents something of a sui generis system of highly centralised multilevel governance and one which, for some, is not consistent with the federal principle at all (Chopin 2002). 

Much of this zealotry stems not from a loyalty to the sub-field of comparative politics per se but, rather, from a desire to emulate those rational choice theorists of American politics whose work has become so influential in the discipline in recent years.  Claims concerning the applicability of rational choice institutionalism as formulated for the American domestic context are based more often than not on a belief in the superiority of rational choice as a method. Rooted in the belief that ‘the ability to generalize across contexts while incorporating local specificity is a signal advantage of institutional analysis’ (Jupille and Caporaso 1999: 438) proponents of such an approach tend to overlook the unique features of international politics, and of states as actors in international politics that require, at the very least, a rethinking of certain of the theoretical assumptions underlying new institutionalist assessments of US politics.

Herein lies the dual paradox of a rational choice institutionalism derived from the study of American politics. On the one hand, it is too specific, in that 

it seems clear that both the theory and the research designs of American studies can be applied beyond the US context only with considerable adaptation. Precisely because they were developed by Americanists with the aim of understanding the specific institutional features of the American political system - that is, congressional committees and regulatory agencies - the theories analysed above have been developed at a relatively low level of abstraction, which makes it difficult to transfer their insights to the very different, and primarily parliamentary, political systems of Western Europe
(Pollack 2002: 210)
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^1	  The author would like to thank Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos, Hussein Kassim, Ed Page, Martin Schain, Elizabeth Edgington and particularly Dan Kelemen for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. In fairness to Dan in particular, I should add that certain suggestions were ignored. 
^2	  In contrast, lawyers had been relatively quick to approach the study of the EC from a comparative perspective, see notably Stein (2000) and Cappelletti, Seccombe et al.(1986).
^3	  The notion of federalism was itself, in its original usage, a term applied to relations between sovereign states rather than one used to classify a certain genus of state (Hendrickson 2003: 22-4).  
^4	  Decontextualisation is not, of course, a problem unique to comparative politics. 
^5	  Note Sbragia’s comment (1991: 274): 'The legacy of the European sovereign state is that national boundaries are extraordinarily important shapers of most aspects of life. The territorial claims that national governments represent, therefore, are exceedingly strong….National identity, political party organisations, party systems, partisan ideology, interest groups, taxing and spending arrangements,  educational systems, electoral constituencies, the internal organisation of the state, executive-legislative relations, the appointment of commissioners and European Court justices, the role of the judiciary, legal systems, and administrative apparatuses are all defined by national territory.' 
^6	  Waltz points to two structural differences between the international system and domestic political systems. The first is the absence of hierarchy amongst states, in contradistinction to domestic systems, which are ‘centralised and hierarchic’ (p. 88). The second is the fact that ‘states…are not formally differentiated by the functions they perform’ (p.93). That is to say that states ‘try to perform tasks, most of which are common to all of them’ (p. 96), whereas national politics ‘consists of differentiated units performing specific functions’ (p. 97).
^7	  Care should be taken even here. It is only recently that Congressional committees have enjoyed particularly the staffing resources necessary to hold agencies to account, and this situation was exacerbated by the cuts implemented by Newt Gingrich in the 1990s. I am grateful to Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos for pointing this out to me. 
^8	  Clearly, this is a question of degree.  Larger states enjoy larger resources, and the European Union, since the enlargement of 2005, now contains a significant number of small states 
^9	  Certainly, promises of future advancement, especially when these are political rather than purely administrative, might be dependent upon relative stability in the partisan composition of government. On the other hand, this is not the case in the context of apolitical administrative systems. Moreover, the partisan nature of government has had relatively little impact on what have been markedly stable member state preferences about European integration over time.
^10	  The phrase was suggested to me by Dan Kelemen.
^11	  The contrast has not always been so clear cut. The United States of the eighteenth century was one in which the relative attractions of state and federal levels were perceived to be more equal. Justice John Rutledge resigned from the Supreme Court in 1791 to become Chief Justice of South Carolina. John Jay, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, was elected  governor of New York in 1795, declining to return to the Court when asked to do so by President John Adams in 1800. My thanks to Dan Kelemen for informing me of this. Moreover, the European Court of Justice is arguably highly similar to its American counterpart in terms of the prestige implied by appointment to the bench.  Yet while the argument presented above applies most clearly to the European Commission, the ECJ also has many features that reflect the entrenched power of member states within the EU system: judges are selected from national judges nominated by governments; all member states are represented on the court, and national courts are ‘coordinate’ rather than inferior courts (Ansell 2004). Moreover, unlike the Supreme Court, the ECJ cannot invalidate a member state statue or act, but has to rely on the state itself to do so, and there have been instances where this has not occurred (Shapiro 1991: 125).
^12	  In addition to interest-based motivations, it is interesting to speculate as to whether notions of loyalty or identity condition the behaviour of member state nationals in the EU institutions. 
^13	  Similarly William Riker assumes (1964: 6) that either a centralising or peripheralising tendency will win out in two level systems. For him, the structure of the party system represented the crucial variable which would determine the ultimate outcome (1964: 129-36)
^14	  This is not to say that Pollack slavishly follows the American literature. He explicitly makes the point that he is wary of  the extremes of either the Congressional abdication hypothesis or the Congressional dominance school, stating that `EC institutions…neither run amok nor blindly follow the wishes of member governments but rather pursue their own preferences within the confines of member state control mechanisms whose efficacy and credibility vary from issue to issue and over time’ (Pollack 1997: 110). Yet his analysis of the constraints upon member state ability effectively to monitor agents and their root causes is fully consistent with the assumptions of students of American politics. 
^15	  The notion of separation of powers of course is generally used to refer to relations between branches of government rather than to the vertical distribution of power in federal states. I would like to thank Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos for making this point to me. 
^16	  Elazar makes a similar point, noting that the ‘EU’s constitution and common institutions have developed in such a way as to minimise the threat to the Member States’ (Elazar 2001: 38)
^17	  Note the wording of the UK referendum question on the constitutional treaty, which asks the voting population to decide if the United Kingdom should sign the Treaty, rather than whether they approve it. 
